


Holocaust Film

Holocaust Film
The Political Aesthetics of Ideology

By

Terri Ginsberg



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In memory of Sam and Lucille Fine

[F]ilm offers the possibility that some of this world can be explained, in the hope that no one will be forced to understand—to experience—such conditions again.

—Judith E. Doneson

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Terri Ginsberg
May 2007

CHAPTER ONE

TOWARDS A CRITIQUE OF HOLOCAUST CINEMATIC CULTURE

Regenerative anti-Semitism [...] is the clue to the uniqueness of National Socialism [...] But it would be a mistake to deduce from this that those historical circumstances had isolated Germany from the West and had set it on a separate “special path” [...] The massacres of the imperialist conquests and the Final Solution are linked by more than “phenomenological affinities” and distant analogies. Between them runs a historical continuity that makes liberal Europe the laboratory of the violence of the twentieth century, and Auschwitz the authentic product of Western civilization.

—Enzo Traverso, *The Origins of Nazi Violence*

It is a commonly accepted fact that the first images of the Holocaust transmitted to the European and North American publics took the form of short documentaries and newsreels containing select footage of concentration camp atrocities either expropriated from Nazi archives or filmed first-hand by Allied liberating forces.¹ It is a commonly accepted opinion that the footage contained in these newsreels comprises some of the most gruesome, horrific, violent images ever to have been recorded on film. Indeed, this footage turns precisely on the sight of mounds of naked corpses numbering in the thousands, droves of skeletal prisoners crammed three to a single wooden bunk or wandering aimlessly after their liberations, scraping rubbish piles for a morsel to eat, and trainloads of displaced and uprooted persons, exhausted from countless days of journey without food or water after months or perhaps years of having been lined up for selection either to be worked or gassed to death. These are the images to which historians, critics, philosophers and theologians alike have referred when designating the Holocaust—the systematic, industrialized mass murder of approximately twelve million people, including Jews (who comprised a disproportionately large percentage of victims), Gypsies (Sinto and Lalleri “Roma”), Soviet prisoners of war, lesbians and gays (“glbtqs”), political resistors (communists, socialists, trade-unionists, and Freemasons), dissident

religious groups (Jehovah's Witnesses, Jesuits), Slavs (Poles, Czechs, Ukrainians), and the mentally and physically infirm and disabled, under the auspices of the German National Socialist Party ("Nazis") during the Second World War. They are also the images that have helped accord the Holocaust the problematical, if undeniable status as one of the most heinous, atrocious, unspeakable, unimaginable, incomprehensible, unrepresentable genocides of all time.

Against this backdrop, however, Holocaust cinematic culture has proliferated and expanded in scope. According to Norman Finkelstein, the Hollywood industry alone has produced at least one hundred seventy-five films on the topic since 1989,² but what Finkelstein might call the "Holocaust film industry" began much earlier, most notably with the highly abstract poetic documentary, *Night and Fog* [*Nuit et brouillard*] (Alain Resnais, France, 1954). This culture then moved into Hollywood melodramas³ which aped formally and ideologically some of the very earliest, pre- and immediate post-liberation films on the subject⁴ and which soon after were accompanied by U.S. network television interviews with survivors and traditional, explicative documentaries about the concentration camp structure and experience.⁵ It then passed into the post-realist, "retro-style" and high art films of the European auteurs,⁶ which eventually also were appropriated into a "New Hollywoodian" aesthetic format,⁷ most notably and paradigmatically by *Schindler's List* (Stephen Spielberg, U.S.A., 1994), but also earlier, by *Sophie's Choice* (Alan J. Pakula, U.S.A., 1982), and later, by *Jacob the Liar* (Peter Kassovitz, U.S.A./France/Hungary, 1999), *Train de vie* ["Train of Life"] (Radu Mihaileanu, Romania/France/Belgium/Netherlands/Israel, 1998), *The Grey Zone* (Tim Blake Nelson, U.S.A., 2001), *The Pianist* (Roman Polański, Poland/Germany/U.K./France, 2002), *Sophie Scholl—The Last Days* [*Sophie Scholl—Die Letzten Tage*] (Marc Rothemund, Germany, 2005), and *Zwartboek* ["The Black Book"] (Paul Verhoeven, Netherlands/Belgium/U.K./Germany, 2007). Finally, and after a spate of popular melodramatic docudramas and theatrical re-runs aired over Hollywood network television,⁸ Holocaust cinematic culture has moved into today's veritable multimedia museum spectacular-extravaganza.⁹

Not widely discussed, however, is the fact that this cinematic cultural proliferation and expansion has been accompanied by a converse movement in cultural theory. That movement relies on a general consensus—fostered and encouraged by both popular and scholarly criticism as well as by many of the films themselves—of the proverbial assignation of the Holocaust as beyond intelligibility or cultural representation. Ideologically speaking, the basis of this consensus is a philosophical problematic for which the Holocaust was so monumental, so horrific, so unique, so phenomenologically *sublime* as to be

capable neither of adequate aesthetic reproduction nor definitive historical and epistemological explanation.¹⁰ Associated with the post-Holocaust writings of Theodor W. Adorno, this consensus consolidates an unspoken taboo against the formal academic study of Holocaust and film, the idea being that such study is tantamount to indulging in obscenity. The range of practices deterred by this consensus varies, furthermore, and includes historical and critical analyses of Holocaust film culture's proliferation and expansion, the institutional sponsorship of such study, curricular development of Holocaust film courses, the funding of Holocaust film research and its publication, and the analysis of film and media installations at Holocaust memorials and museums. Indeed, to date, and contrasting the voluminous character of Holocaust historical, sociological, and philosophical studies, one is struck by the relative dearth of Holocaust film criticism, not to mention courses, in the contemporary academy, where Holocaust cinema studies finds its structural origin and center.¹¹ This contrasts the popular print media's preponderant, often vibrantly contestational focus on the subject both in North America and parts of Europe, which strikes one as ironic in that one of the most canonical, widely read and discussed, and not coincidentally controversial Cinema Studies texts, Kracauer's *From Caligari to Hitler*, articulates its critique of Weimar cinema in terms of pervasive discursive affiliation with the Third Reich and the Holocaust.¹² Moreover, where criticism of Holocaust film does exist, the interpretive paradigms to which it adheres are not generally those established from within Cinema Studies but from within fields largely unassociated with the study of moving-image culture such as Sociology, History, Religion, Philosophy, and Language Studies. In these discursive contexts, Holocaust film is more often than not confined to an informational or illustrative function rather than presented as an occasion for analysis in its own right: Holocaust documentaries are lent scholarly priority, whereas Holocaust narrative and experimental films are marginalized or ignored, as are critical analyses concerned with the specifically cinematic aspects of Holocaust representation, including especially their rhetorical implication in the ideologies of Holocaust reproducibility itself. The result is a series of conventional thematic and stylistic readings or, in an opposite—yet at times complementary—sense, a congeries of mystical and theosophical speculation for which the Holocaust emblemizes a category of *belief* rather than marks a node for its critical theorization.

As an entry point into this issue, the present book poses the following question: Is there some underlying or extenuating rationale for the apparent contradiction between an expansive array of Holocaust film production, on the one hand, and a disproportionately minimal amount of serious Holocaust film scholarship, on the other? After all, whether one agrees or not with the ostensibly Adornian paradigm, Holocaust films do often lend themselves to the

literal definition of obscenity. Newsreel documentaries and documentaries containing newsreel footage, with their pathetic depictions of naked corpses and barely clad concentration and death camp prisoners, do meet the cultural, if not legal, criteria of “obscenity.” This condition, which cultural theorist Peter Michelson has defined lucidly and candidly as “the Greek sense of bringing onstage what is customarily kept offstage in western culture,” entails a presumably necessary aestheticization of the so-called un(re)presentable, “a perceptual alteration whereby the obscene, a species of the ugly, is reconstituted to a function akin to that of the beautiful.”¹³ “Obscenity” is a condition that consequently adopts and tries to domesticate qualities simultaneously of the culturally offensive, perversely pleasurable, and socially threatening.¹⁴ More figuratively and complexly, the Adornian taboo, as it is commonly interpreted, presupposes the Holocaust as a socially enabled occasioning of death so horrible, unprecedented, and historically paradigmatic that its representative artistic rendering is conceivable only as a mimesis of Nazi ideology itself. In other words, the representation of the Holocaust is considered an aesthetic reformulation of an historical phenomenon considered always already generative of mass destruction, and henceforth as *essentially* obscene, in both structure and spectatorial effects.¹⁵

This perspective, widely attributed to Adorno, is in fact prototypical of Michelson. The latter’s literal definition of “obscenity” is undergirded by a structuralist understanding of the philosophical dialectic on the sublime, for which the cultural reconstitution of what is traditionally forbidden from appearing “onstage” is an effect of “the modern and especially contemporary assertiveness of [...] materialism.” In this sense, Michelson’s “obscenity” is reminiscent of the Freudian “uncanny,” which, accessing aesthetic-idealist philosopher Friedrich W. J. v. Schelling, refers to everything “that ought to have remained hidden and yet comes to light.”¹⁶ Yet Michelson sees the “obscene” not as some romantic or idealist notion of a profound, uncannily alluring truth of nature, but as those global conditions and practices of capitalism, including the technological development it fosters, that are sublimated, suppressed, dissimulated, or diverted from view. To be clear, Michelson ultimately understands such conditions and practices along Heideggerian lines, as fundamental and irrepressible, even while recognizing their quite visible perpetuation of social misery.¹⁷ On his apologetic view, these conditions and practices can and must be relegated to “obscenity” for the threat of violence widespread knowledge of them is thought capable of posing to the status quo.

Michelson’s apologeticism is likewise discernible in the ontological analogy he draws between this structural-materialist dialectic (which he affirms as a necessary existential context for techno-capitalist development) and the post-romantic Freudian libido (which he upholds as a referential axis of naturalized

corporeal experience). By marked contrast, Adorno's analysis of the Holocaust cultural problematic is more theoretical and decidedly politicized. Accessing and incorporating critiques of ontology by Max Horkheimer, Walter Benjamin, and György Lukács reading Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels,¹⁸ Adorno foregrounds what he sees as the social institutional parameters of the "obscene."¹⁹ In so doing, he critically reorients the traditional discursive mediation and dissimulation—*reification*—of "obscenity" by relocating aesthetic concerns away from the ontological onto the class-political and -conceptual planes. From this social-relational—*praxological*—perspective, by and large ignored by Holocaust film critics but increasingly apparent in Adorno's subsequent attempts to qualify his original statement,²⁰ no strict ontological affinity obtains between or amongst the material and the libidinal registers of Holocaust cultural production: attempts to represent the Holocaust are viewed politically rather than poetically. Holocaust representation is always in the first instance an economic question of conceptual division and selection—*exploitation*—framed historically by aesthetic ideologies, especially those associated with romantic tradition, themselves overdetermined within the asymmetrical social relations of capitalist reproduction as they extend, most pertinently, into Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.²¹ The phenomenon of libidinal attraction to the sublime is itself likewise always preconditioned—at the level of technocultural form as well as referential content—and linked ideologically to the aesthetic philosophical series; again, especially problematic, nay, "obscene," is the (post-)romantic tendency to thematize the material register across, or otherwise reduce it to, a libidinal-cultural nexus.²²

* * * * *

As the relative dearth of serious Holocaust film scholarship over the years suggests, the purported Adornian taboo against comprehending the Holocaust through romanticized, rhetorically abstract lenses has been greatly misunderstood. The consistent scholarly tendency has been to interpret the Holocaust according to a perspective more akin to that of Michelson, for whom the "obscene" is conceived phenomenologically, almost mystically, as an event that can never really be comprehended, much less known conceptually. This tendency conveniently rapproches iconoclastic claims dependent upon the proverbial, oft-misunderstood Judaic proscription against fideistic imagery,²³ which lend religious credence to that tendency while in fact further mystifying attempts to visually represent the Holocaust. The consequence for Cinema Studies is that the Holocaust can never really be represented, much less understood, beyond those romantic, aesthetic-philosophical, techno-libidinal parameters misidentified with Adorno. Apropos of this misidentification,

Holocaust film criticism, when practiced with at least a semblance of disciplinary seriousness, has consistently conformed to the basic discursive parameters of phenomenology and, by historical extension, the ideology of Christian moral philosophy.²⁴ With remarkably few exceptions, all of them important and valuable but finally phenomenological in approach,²⁵ most texts of Holocaust film criticism have presented analyses or reviews of Holocaust films which devise an irreducibly opaque epistemological relationship across the historical, philosophical, and formal-textual registers of those films. On this tack, the only guiding question permitted is methodological: how best to ascertain, or at least to approximate, the relationship between representation and event. What this allows, however, is little more than the management and containment of any real knowledge one might acquire about that relationship, including its purported aesthetic foundations and the instability and volatility attributed to them. In short, Holocaust film criticism has disallowed *radical* connection between the historical generation, industrial production, technological construction, and subjective interpellation of Holocaust cinematicity itself. In an uncanny rehearsal of Christian medieval scholasticism, which disassociated historical and epistemological relationships from their empirical or existential axes and rearticulated them to ostensibly inaccessible, sensual or highly privatized states, most of this criticism limits itself instead to a skilled hermeneutic decoding of complicated, often esoteric rhetorical forms, an elite practice compelling critics to approach those ostensibly inaccessible states as though, in so doing, they will manifest protection against the perceived chaos or evil of what comes in turn to stand as the material, quotidian—"Jewish"—world.²⁶

Even as Holocaust film criticism has moved from its earlier, existential-ontological articulations to the hermeneutic modalities informing contemporary postmodern scholarship, it has continued to uphold basic phenomenological postulates that are in line with the Christian moral foundations of aesthetic philosophy.²⁷ One of these postulates is that objects, including objects of culture, can and should be known only approximately, by cognitive inspection of their apparent forms. Another is that the binding analogy of these forms is an intentional, normative, synthetic, self-correcting, ever-excessive "elsewhere" or "other," the introjection and displacement of which by the community of critics is thought to render it universally valid by virtue of its imbrication within a social logics of imminent but unknowable necessity.²⁸ A third is that the meaning and significance of this consensual analogy between object and form—this structuring absence—may itself only be approximated; this approximation can at best be pursued, furthermore, by comparative analysis of plural, uncanny variations as these are perceived to manifest self-evidently in the very object of analysis, the (un)intended, sacralized "thing-in-itself" (*die Sache*).²⁹ This is to

say, more plainly, that Holocaust film criticism has enacted a paradigm shift from high philosophical to more conventional aesthetics, by which it has been able to re-articulate theological premises to a quotidian, ecumenical framework known commonly as the “Judeo-Christian.”³⁰ From this perspective, the “other” of traditional aesthetics—the “Jew” of Christian moralism—is assimilated onto a post-philosophical, immanent, anthropological plane, where its distinguishing cultural markers are relinquished and its social stigmatization is ameliorated, but where its “otherness” is nonetheless retained. An abiding example is the persistent Wandering Jew myth, with its connotations of inherent or unavoidable sinfulness and deserved, eternal suffering,³¹ in discourses on modern Jewish tribulation and catastrophe, including those of Holocaust film criticism. These essentially christo-phenomenological—*christological*—foundations, contextualizing a modern-day, at times secular, revision of christic nature and redemption, profoundly contradict the Holocaust film criticism that on its face purports to theorize its critical difference on, inter alia, Judaically informed principles.

Suffice it here to say that the effect of this persisting christological approach has been the propagation of a relatively circumscribed perspective on Holocaust film culture, the judgmental lapses and misprisions of which have become excusable on private (legally protected) grounds of religious propriety. A telling characteristic of this perspective is that a refusal to merely approximate the purported, designated “other,” whether conceived on Christian or “Judeo-Christian” grounds, becomes tantamount to hubris, to the promotion of critical modalities deemed intellectually violent or “totalizing.”³² Holocaust film criticism has, in effect, by and large preempted critical epistemological theorization by implicitly adopting the conciliatory, Christian moral belief in the material world as an essentially fallen, inherently destructive, teleologically motivated “acceptance-phenomenon.”³³ In this context, the *radical* materialist kernel of the Adornian taboo, which would facilitate rearticulating the opacity at the core of the phenomenological function to the systemic structures of social relations and institutional practices that comprise its historical-objective crux, is denied. Indeed, what for Adorno is etched indelibly at the barbaric core of Western civilization—of global capitalism and its ideological ethos—as an occurrence incomprehensible without sustained consideration of its social-institutional and especially political-economic determinants, becomes instead for Holocaust film criticism an index of human fallibility. That fallibility, moreover, lies beyond the conceptual horizon where questions can be posed without provoking the same sorts of barbarity against which human society has historically been compelled to struggle and to seek “redemption.” On the christological reading, Holocaust film criticism presents the Holocaust as but a necessary irruption and reenactment of this presumed essential human fallibility,

the social significance of which is reduced to the proverbial moral lesson: Jewish victims of the Holocaust—*Judeocide* victims³⁴—like Jesus “Christ” before them, are raised—resurrected—to the status of that event’s defining, (self-)sacrificial “other.” By extension, the question of the Holocaust’s *other* victims—not to mention the victims of additional prior, concurrent, and subsequent genocides and ethnic cleansings—and the question of the social determinants of all these events, are effectively ignored or transposed and played out in terms of christic sacrifice, via the standardized dialectic of the Holocaust.³⁵

One might usefully invoke in this regard the philosopher Emmanuel Levinas, whose secular Jewish-phenomenological critique of ontological formulations has itself been justifiably critiqued for its contradictory reinscription of conceptual opacities (“Infinity,” “the Other”) that have been considered symptomatic of his equivocal position on Zionism as well as of his patriarchal bias.³⁶ At his most interesting, Levinas warns emphatically against the adoption of christo-anthropocentric notions, that is, of the mythicized phenomenological groundings which he sees dangerously precluding sustained interrogation of the means of forestalling genocidal violence and catastrophe.³⁷ To Levinas, the invocation of notions such as these leads to an elision of the very different Judaic concept of sacrifice, which entails an interrogative and entirely worldly adherence to a critical, anti-authoritarian, radically differential—proto-Adornian—Judaic social covenant of mending the universe [*tikkun ha-olam*].³⁸ Indeed as Levinas recognizes, the Judaic conceptualization of sacrifice is largely unconcerned with the appropriative re(an)nunciation or regenerative (re)assumption of an “other,” whether anthropologically or ideally conceived. This is by no means to suggest that certain prevailing notions of “otherness” do not figure within Judaic textual tradition and extenuating social practices, as Jewish anti-Zionist scholars Israel Shahak and Norton Mezvinsky powerfully remind.³⁹ It is to clarify, however, that when “otherness” is invoked in Jewish philosophy, it figures not an ideal allegory of suffering and exclusion—the universal *epōkhe* (bracketing) of the phenomenological reduction—but marks the praxology itself of social materiality which affects differentially—and therefore does not necessitate teleologically—the historical framing and development of so-called objective reality and the functioning of human subjects in relation thereto.

At the hermeneutical register, this critical praxis may be expressed in terms of *le-didakh*, a Judaic analytic technique which involves extending a hypothetical, second-person perspective a sometimes indefinite concession in an initial, if eventually relinquished effort to render possible a primary postulate or contention. The Eastern Aramaic phrase, *le-didakh*, is a dialectical concept deployed most recently by Judaic scholar Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi,⁴⁰ which

occurs in the Babylonian Talmud approximately eighty-seven times. It means “according to that (opinion) which is yours,” that is, “according to your opinion.” Its Hebrew equivalent is *le-daatkha*, and its definition is similar to that of the Hebrew phrase, *u-le-ta'amekh*, meaning “according to your reasoning.” According to Talmudic scholar Louis Jacobs, whose position in this regard is implicitly supported by Yerushalmi, *u-le-ta'amekh* is but one of three types of comparative or differential Talmudic argumentative methods, the other two being *ve-tisbera* [“and even according to your theory”], which entails exposing flaws in an opponent’s position, and *ka-saleka da'atekh* [“you might have supposed”], which entails forwarding an argument with the intention of rejecting it.⁴¹ On the further view of another Talmudic scholar, Adin Steinsaltz, *u-le-ta'amekh* (or, what we shall refer to in our text as *le-didakh* for the sake of linguistic ease and expedience as well as in deference to the popular-mass significance of the Aramaic) is distinguished by its tactic of *shinuya* [“argument by alternative demonstration”], which entails both the question, posed by a *makshan* [questioner], *Ve-dilma ipkha?* [“And perhaps the opposite is true?”], and the hypothetical reply, offered by the *tartzan* [respondent], *Ipkha mistbra* [“The opposite holds”].⁴²

Importantly, the “other” in a “le-didakhic” encounter refers to neither the hypothetical second person nor his/her perspective, whose designations as such would only serve to reify them vis-à-vis the first person and, by the same token, lend sovereign authority to the latter: *le-didakh* is fundamentally obverse to the techniques of opportunism and cooptation.⁴³ More and other than sophistical rhetoric (although it can and does devolve into that, as I shall discuss in Chapter Three), *le-didakh* refers instead to a conditional dialectic which overdetermines any such perspective and whose asymmetrically attuned, ultimately social grounding signals a seeming paradox that is nonetheless historical and, as such, subject to concrete—really contested—knowledgeability and change: it hails both the “not-yet” and the “might-have-been.”⁴⁴ Serious engagement with the praxis of *le-didakh* can therefore contribute to effecting radical paradigm shifts in prevailing understandings of the social conditions in which it may be possible to approach and (come to) know the second person, the “other” and his/her perspective.

A phenomenologist, Levinas will in the end only *perform* any such intellectual shift; his imperative is to achieve “ethical rapport with the face of the other.”⁴⁵ Indeed Jewish phenomenology does not finally reject the moral comprehensibility of its Christian counterpart but supplements it with a Judaic bracketing of the ontological register on iconoclastic grounds that to name or otherwise thematize it, as Christianity does via the figure of Christ, is to hypostasize it and thereby to collapse it onto an existential realm whose infinite limits confine metonymically the dialectics of social reparation to the telos of

regenerative sacrifice.⁴⁶ This metaphysical limitation notwithstanding,⁴⁷ Levinas' anti-philosophical thematization of *le-didakh*, that is, of Judaic sacrificial hermeneutics, renders the horizons of his ethical imperative and its performance structurally inseparable from the critical epistemology, familiar to Adornian critical theory and contemporary derivatives such as cultural materialism and structuralist Marxism, that works to resituate and resolve the social contradictions underlying historical and cultural dramas of differentiation while refusing nonetheless to discount different narratives and modes of response to them, whether these derive from the recognized past or arise concurrent with those dramas. Jewish philosophical "otherness" thus refers to the possibility of an a-theological—in effect, atheistic—field of social organization entailing a self-consciously problematical view to institutions and other systemic structures of social division and intelligibility such as class, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, and creed. It involves, in effect, a simultaneously *ideological* and *interrogative* praxis subtending the asymmetrical historical rift Jew–Gentile, which the albeit marginalized "Jewish" is obligated to help repair, or mend—not by figuring a false and premature assimilation of one pole of the binarism into the other, but by cleaving to, while critically destabilizing, the deep structures of their differentiation.

This historical rift, it must also be recognized, is sometimes thought so deeply ingrained in the social imaginary that a protracted, seemingly unresolvable, often mutually exacerbated struggle has been considered necessary for its reparation actually to occur.⁴⁸ "Judeo-Christian" opponents of social reparation have often exploited this assertion in reactionary terms to affirm a penultimate sense of perpetual trial and tribulation that justifies continued propagation of eschatological and certain messianic modes of "Otherness." On these assertions, the "Jewish" emblemizes an eternal or at least divinely ordained crusade against the West's presumed mortal enemies, including especially Palestinians, Arabs, and Muslims, but also Blacks, indigenous peoples, people of the Left, gbltqs, and feminists.⁴⁹ It is this development which symptomatizes the metaphysical, reificatory, even christological horizon of Jewish phenomenological ambivalence, both through and against which the present book will work via the critical theoretical analysis it offers of Holocaust cinematic culture.

* * * * *

However the "obscene" quality of Holocaust cultural representation may be conceived and dealt with, the dedicated Holocaust film scholar must inevitably struggle with these overriding aesthetico-moral contentions. Recalling Hannah Arendt's perception of incisive intellectual practice as, following Camus, both

“*solidaire et solitaire*,”⁵⁰ these contentions position the critic as both an exemplar of “redemptive” Holo-sacrifice and a “perverse” purveyor of a cultural practice notable, even laudable, for marking what Horkheimer and Adorno might have called an “embarrassment beyond intelligibility”⁵¹ with the extreme horror and violence it undeniably depicts and displays. Keeping this in mind, I shall endeavor in the present book to pursue a serious analysis of Holocaust film culture. In view of the phenomenological character of much Holocaust film criticism, I will supply an analysis of specific Holocaust film critical texts which saliently exemplify this character and its ideological implications. Aiming toward a socially grounded, historically attuned, theoretically oriented approach, this intellectual analysis will not be limited to a comparative description (explication or mimesis) of films or critical texts. Rather, it will work epistemologically to elucidate, interrogate, and critically resituate reasons they offer critics for resisting a sustained critique of Holocaust film onto the material institutional register that Adorno believed so crucial to an anti-genocidal—if not entirely comfortable or reassuring—Holocaust cultural analysis.

Before doing this, however, it behooves me to acknowledge briefly that the development of Holocaust film culture has in fact been approached in decidedly political, if not always materialist ways both outside the academy and mostly in fields other than Cinema Studies. Most prominent in this regard are popular print media reviews of, and ensuing public debates over, various Holocaust films as well as significant scholarly publications on, and likewise ensuing public debates over, the relationship of the Holocaust to the contemporary study of history, social science, philosophy, and law. For instance, following the onset of Holocaust historiography debates in France and Germany during the late 1970s and early 1980s,⁵² themselves responding in part to the politically provocative Hollywood tele-films, *Holocaust* and *Playing for Time*, and to controversial developments in the scholarly critical sphere (deconstruction, cultural studies, new historicism, critical legal theory), a wave of book-length texts on contemporary Holocaust culture and society began to be published. The primary source materials for these texts were print media reviews of and debates over Holocaust (film) culture and other public occasions of Holocaust discourse such as those involving Holocaust denial and revisionism. The underlying if not always explicit contentions of these otherwise widely divergent texts supported the liberal notion that, for better or worse, Holocaust culture, discourse and representation were irrevocably political—especially national-political—in both context and orientation. Moreover, attempts to argue otherwise, despite or even because of the Holocaust’s irrefutable horror and violence, were themselves implicated in dubious ideological agendas. These texts displayed and in some instances argued for a broad, interdisciplinary approach to the subject of the Holocaust, even when the scope of that subject’s articulations became

necessarily limited by particular methodologies and the critical, often ideological, tendencies associated with them.

In *The Holocaust and American Film*, for example, Judith Doneson, a Jewish Studies scholar trained largely in Israel, insists upon the situation of Holocaust film culture within a specific national-political context. Although conceding with her contemporary, film scholar Annette Insdorf (*Indelible Shadows*), the legitimacy of the aesthetic-philosophical problematic, Doneson lends priority to the historiographic question of Holocaust cinema's public presence and concern in the postwar U.S. Acknowledging with Kracauer, whose later writings on cinema have been a central reference point in contemporary film phenomenology,⁵³ a lurid shock-effect of violent Holocaust imagery, Doneson is more interested in how Holocaust films—especially Hollywood productions—have helped to “assimilate the Holocaust into the popular consciousness,” such that the Holocaust has become a paradigm of the U.S. “immigrant” experience: “thematizing” current events, “catalyzing” the European Holocaust historiography debates, and adopting a “specific Jewishness” while also becoming “a universal message for mankind.”⁵⁴ Doneson's perspective is supported in its critical effect by *Denying the Holocaust*, in which historian Deborah Lipstadt critiques North American Holocaust historiography debates for their imbrication with the postmodern literary theory known as deconstruction and associated most prominently in the Anglo-American academy with literary theorists Jacques Derrida and Paul de Man. Extending and honing the historicism necessary to Doneson's formulations, Lipstadt argues for a return to a more empirical scholarly practice that, by its requisite collection and specification of data, can, on her view, offer a corrective to postmodern antifoundationalism and the “relativism” with which, again on her view, it has served Holocaust denial and right-revisionism.⁵⁵ Doneson's implicit reading is that such postmodern theories have served to undermine the positive ideology-effects she associates with North American Holocaust films. Her decidedly culturalist focus is, however, less specifically concerned with Holocaust historiography than with Hollywood's uncertain ability to offer a “balanced” negotiation of the Holocaust's “universal and particular” significance, which Holocaust historiography debates have on her view neglected: she contends that to ensure such a balance, Hollywood filmmaking must affirm a “Jewish particularity” of the Holocaust, then “triangulate” that assumed particularity with the larger role she believes its cinematic rendering plays in justifying the existence of Israel, its political stance and military actions, to the U.S. general public. Indeed for Doneson, this Zionist triangulation—“America at the top with Israel and the Holocaust at the base”—is inseparable from and “forms the foundation of [a globally significant] American Jewish identification” that she considers necessary to “[our]

vigilan[ce] in defense of freedom.”⁵⁶

More sophisticated theoretically in its approach is *Screening the Holocaust*, in which Israeli literary and cultural scholar Ilan Avisar applies the conservative methodology, New Criticism,⁵⁷ to a close textual analysis of Holocaust film noticeably absent from the thematic and generic approaches of Doneson and of Insdorf.⁵⁸ Despite and because of its methodological and disciplinary difference, however, *Screening the Holocaust* remains ideologically consonant with the critical aims of its predecessors. Indeed Avisar’s relatively traditional interpretive methodology flatly disregards deconstruction as a possible mode of Holocaust analysis. It respects the same aesthetic moralism, for which Holocaust imagery is essentially obscene (hence the book’s subtitle, “Cinema’s Images of the Unimaginable”), and it recommends that Holocaust filmmaking exercise “artistic restraint” lest spectators become dangerously “saturated” with Holocaust films’ admittedly difficult imagery. Echoing feminist cultural theorist Julia Kristeva, whose *Powers of Horror* makes no secret of its christo-romantic underpinnings, and literary theorist Saul Friedländer, whose *Reflections of Nazism* marks the seminal designation of Holocaust imagery as pornographic,⁵⁹ Avisar is concerned that such a saturation will, by its apparent sensuality, arouse extreme visceral reactions in spectators that may promote a fascist resurgence accompanied by antisemitic violence.⁶⁰ Although Avisar refers to these reactions as “emotional, mindless, and even convulsive (e.g., nervous laughter, or even perverse pleasure),”⁶¹ his ideas about the social and historical conditions which might provoke them are politically limited and lacking in scholarly credibility. The military occupation and protracted war that may be linked to Doneson’s U.S.–Israel triangulation and the Jewish particularism thought necessary to it, for instance, both of which have been considered responsible for a contemporary blowback that has ironically fomented and renewed “real” antisemitism in the contemporary social arena,⁶² go unremarked. Avisar instead focuses on condemning the “nihilistic irony and pessimistic vision” of modernist Holocaust films, which he accuses of “decadence” and associates prejudicially with their depiction of non-normative sexualities.⁶³ For him, cinematic displays of homosexuality, understood in reactionary terms as a flagship of social decay, is a forboding omen of future holocausts and our inability to forestall them. After a mystical fashion that recalls Michelson but overlooks his (and Kracauer’s) materialism, Avisar quotes Jewish cultural historian Irving Howe in contending that this socially dangerous potential of Holocaust imagery is “absolute[ly] revelatory”: it is an organic effect of mysterious compulsion originating beyond social proprieties and cultural constraints, and oriented past the competing nationalisms allegorized but not, on Avisar’s view, overcome by the inherent polysemy which a New Critical approach attributes to (film) textuality.⁶⁴ As a corrective, Avisar quotes

structuralist literary critic Tzvetan Todorov in calling for a Holocaust film criticism that can screen out these purported dangers through a clarifying technique of descriptive demonstration, and that can thereby resist the Holocaust's so-called obscenity while retaining for it Doneson's sacral, singularly Jewish significance.⁶⁵

Likewise clearly political and interdisciplinary in its approach to the problematics of Holocaust cultural and historical intelligibility is Dominick LaCapra's *Representing the Holocaust*. LaCapra's work is a sustained analysis of Holocaust cultural and historiographical critique for which deconstruction is also a questionable mode of Holocaust analysis; it posits historical specificity, empirical factuality, and textual clarity as less crucial to a serious understanding of the Holocaust and its socio-cultural effects, however, than a controlled, psychoanalytically based exposure and rehearsal of Holocaust discourse itself. A socially meaningful Holocaust cultural practice entails for LaCapra an allegorical performance, a controlled reflection of traumatic, Holocaust-rooted (I shall call these *holocaustal*) symptoms from their perceived manifestations in cultural and behavioral forms back onto the discursive conditions thought possibly to enable them. LaCapra's idea is that such symptoms not be understood primarily as threats to a national-political or ethno-religious order, as would seem the case for Lipstadt and for Avisar, but on a transnational-political scale more akin to the culturalist perspective of a likewise ethnocentric Doneson. In his view, holocaustal symptoms are occasions for a transferential, dialogic "exchange" between contestatory, even formerly ideologically opposed interlocutors, namely Jews and Gentiles, interested in "mediating" and "modulating"—but, importantly, never in closing off—their perspectival differences. LaCapra believes that this "Judeo-Christian" exchange, this ethical reenactment of holocaustal feelings between assumed victims and assumed perpetrators, marks the essential, irreducible instability of Holocaust symptomatology; its causal or epistemological explanations, including analysis of their applicability to global politics, not least as symptomatized by the conflict in Israel/Palestine, would by contrast, on his view, spell a recipe for repeated disaster.⁶⁶

The explicit attention lent by these well-known, oft-cited works in Holocaust studies to the (trans)national politicality and cross-disciplinarity of Holocaust critical and cultural discourse is not only crucial to their respective arguments but intersects the tendency of earlier, politically progressive, though persistently controversial Holocaust studies texts. *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, *Anti-Semite and Jew*, *Faschismus*, *Rassenwahn*, *Judenverfolgung*, *Fascism and Dictatorship*, and *Why Did the Heavens Not Darken?* are among texts in which Holocaust knowledgeability is determined and comprehended socio-historically before aesthetically.⁶⁷ It is therefore all the more unfortunate that, unlike their

predecessors, the more recent, film critical efforts take explicitly conservative positions vis-à-vis their subject matter by accessing and employing the phenomenologically structured, christologically oriented paradigm in order to dissimulate the very knowledge they would appear interested in exploring.

Both Doneson and Lipstadt belie their ostensible political progressivism with qualifications consonant with a neoliberal agenda. For Doneson, this entails designating Holocaust film culture a viable means of projecting and universalizing the North American ideology of a manifestly destined, redemptive melting pot—an ideology well known to critics of the film western, *film noir*, and science fiction film⁶⁸—to a global audience, and hence of its advocating North American “democratization” (socio-economic expansion) abroad, especially in the Middle East. Such an assertion, furthermore, has an ontotheological layer, which Doneson attempts tenaciously to legitimize by reference to the writings of Talmudic scholar Jacob Neusner:⁶⁹ she holds that the Holocaust, as the domain of the christological “Jew,” is best represented as an allegory of universal human sin, suffering, and salvation:

[T]he Holocaust functions as a model, a paradigm, or a framework for understanding history. It is a metaphor that teaches a lesson [...] The more visible the event becomes, the greater are its chances of being internalized by the American psyche [which] brings with it a tendency toward Americanization. [In this way] the Holocaust becomes part of the American tradition [...] one of the principle components of the civil religion of American Jews [a redemptive modality which] defies despair [...] and connotes the idea of integrating into the myth of liberty and equality. (Doneson, *Holocaust in American Film*, 9–10, 91, 146, 161, 201)

Celebrating the Holocaust as “Holocaust,” as a concept allegorizable to North American manifest destiny, Doneson rehearses the tendency of much non-Holocaust film genre criticism to exculpate cinematic depictions of extreme violence against marginalities and “others” such as Native Americans (the western), women (*film noir*), and “aliens” (science-fiction) as part of a larger project of regenerating and universalizing the “American” national mythos.⁷⁰ Her references to a “triangulated” U.S. “vigilance” and support for Israeli “political and military actions” in the name of a bolstered “Jewish identity” must therefore be read as transcribing that tendency toward violence so emphatically into a discourse on redemptive civil religiosity that what may at first have appeared a principled historiographic critique of Hollywoodian constructions of the Holocaust is revealed as nothing less than their dubious affirmation.

Although less blatant, Lipstadt likewise upholds the Holocaust and, by extension, the “Jews,” as exemplars of North American manifest destiny, as she rehearses a theologically rooted transcription of that discourse onto

contemporary U.S. foreign policy practices.⁷¹ Ironically appropriating the very deconstructionism she has ostensibly rejected, Lipstadt, in an opposite yet complementary tack to that of Avisar, selectively abandons empiricism for rationalist abstraction, thereby downplaying the centrality of the actual genocides of Native Americans and African-American slaves to North American “destiny.” In the process, she dislocates the support she more explicitly offers the deregulatory economic policies of Reagan and Bush from concomitant criticisms, such as those advanced by Doneson, of Reagan’s 1986 visit to the S.S. cemetery at Bitburg.⁷² The glaring contradictory quality of these tacks is not resolved by a subsequent reference to Genesis: “God’s presence can be found in many different places and made manifest in a variety of ways.”⁷³

Avisar’s stated belief in the Jewish specificity of the Holocaust likewise symptomatizes a dubious if more sectarian politics. Like Doneson, Avisar purports to ground his analytic rationalism in empirical practice and historical specificity, as he advises Holocaust filmmakers to uphold “respect for fact,” “truthful referentiality,” and “historical allegiance.”⁷⁴ On his view, only Holocaust survivors may be excused for “excessive” fictionalizing, and that is because their accounts are based ostensibly on “direct personal experience.”⁷⁵ But whereas Doneson and Insdorf may refuse the application of “Holocaust” to what they otherwise clearly recognize was the Nazi targeting of Roma, gbltqs, Freemasons, leftists, and other dissenters, Avisar entirely and unabashedly denies the well-documented victimhood of these groups.⁷⁶ On his finally ahistorical view (typical of many Zionist and most official Israeli narratives of the Holocaust), it is simply antisemitic to designate as Holocaust victims non-Jews persecuted by the Nazis; this can only contribute to the “fostering of Christian ideology on the back of the Jews and their tragedy.” For Avisar, such an approach in fact “dominates the cinematic treatment of the Holocaust.”⁷⁷ Notwithstanding these pronouncements, Avisar concurs with the similarly self-contradictory Doneson that the Holocaust furnishes universal ethical dimensions that may be safely represented in careful deference to Christian sensibilities. Hence his ironic reference to Christian existentialist philosopher Søren Kierkegaard in the course of imploring Holocaust filmmakers to take a “leap into unfaith” while “imagining” how best to depict the Holocaust.⁷⁸

The liberal Insdorf (until more recently the only professional film scholar of the group), likewise does not refute the Christian view, entailed by Avisar’s Jewish particularist critique, that Jews are especially vulnerable to social violence for their perceived unique character as perpetually homeless and wandering. On this view, Jews threaten “national consciousness” and trigger a Western “suicidal impulse” that marks theologically the conditions for a voluntary “second Fall.”⁷⁹ As a preventative antidote to this apocalyptic scenario, Insdorf quotes right-libertarian ideologue Bernard Henri-Lévy,

conservative literary critic George Steiner, and renowned Holocaust survivor Elie Wiesel in advocating for an elevation of Holocaust imagery beyond commodification. By this she does not mean to oppose Holocaust representation to the system of capitalism per se or indeed to the Western democracies that comprise its global hegemon. Insdorf in fact confuses commodification with mythification: in view of the latter, which in this instance entails rehearsing a morally buttressed, intrinsic linkage between capitalism and Judaism, Insdorf finds highly suspect much popular, mass-culture Holocaust film. For her as for Avisar, "Holocaust" is not a commoditizable concept but an "ontological phenomenon" dangerously allegorized by mythical, usually Christian accounts.⁸⁰ This suspicion of Holocaust commodification is certainly not unjustifiable in light of historical findings which reveal how the "Jew" did come to figure a paradigmatic, ideological agent and barter-ball—indeed a supra-commodity—in the racialized destruction of peoples and places that since the Holocaust has come to emblemize the post-European reorganization of global capitalism of which German fascism was a political symptom and facilitator. That figuring may indeed have enabled the sort of philosemitic recasting of Jewish subjectivity in the postwar era which Doneson implicitly promotes, but does not name, as an ideological means by which Western capitalist nations, including Israel, may seek and receive moral compensation for the violence they continue to commit in the "humanitarian" names of democracy, peace and freedom. Insdorf's and Avisar's understandings, however, of the theoretical relation, commodification–mythification, sidesteps this crucial point, turning instead upon a category error which collapses the register of social-systemic praxis (the relations of capitalist reproduction) onto that of cultural-structural organization (the ideological institutionalization of myth), and in this way obscures important functional differences between the two registers that are only explained away by deference—positive or negative—to the "Jewish." It does not seem to occur to either Insdorf or Avisar that a call for the elevation of the Holocaust, or any historical event, "beyond commodification" is impossible because already intrinsic to that very system, for which the idea or product divested of exchange value marks precisely the horizon of universal value against which all other, lesser values are gauged⁸¹—and which, in the contemporary global arena, configures the direction and scope of U.S. foreign policy, including its "special alliance" with Israel. By overlooking this systemic function, these critics actually alienate the Judeocide within a socially disengaged framework of Holocaust analysis eerily compatible with the Christian narratives they reject.⁸² Avisar's positioning of the Holocaust beyond competing nationalisms and social propriety, then, like Insdorf's elevation of the Holocaust beyond commodification, is not merely ahistorical; it is nothing less than reificatory, serving disingenuously to dissimulate the violent, exploitative

epōkhe, the rationalist reductivism at the core of both New Criticism and the U.S.–Israeli alliance supported implicitly by Avisar’s and Doneson’s particularist characterizations of the Holocaust as specifically “Jewish.”

Even more problematic in this series of key examples is LaCapra, for it is his methodological recommendation which marks an increasingly predominant discursive tendency within an already problematic Holocaust cinema studies. Like Doneson, LaCapra supports the global dissemination of “Americanism,” to which he refers at different points as “pragmatism,” “ethicopolitics,” “creative modes of consumption,” “secular sacrifice,” and, most tellingly, “wizened evangelicism.”⁸³ Like Lipstadt and Avisar, he appropriates into this overtly “Judeo-Christian” ideologic the politically more progressive writings of earlier Holocaust theorists whose respective critiques of particular modalities of Holocaust intelligibility he at once rejects and co-opts.⁸⁴ Unlike these contemporaries, however, and in a move that is cannily attractive to contemporary film scholarship, LaCapra’s methodological grounding in post-Lacanian psychoanalysis lends his “Judeo-Christian” appropriation of earlier Holocaust theory a decidedly *neophenomenological* character. That is to say, LaCapra incorporates the poststructuralist psychotherapeutic concept of perpetual dialogic exchange and (counter)transference associated with object-relations theory and rearticulated most recently in film studies via the postmarxist writings of Gilles Deleuze.⁸⁵ As a result, LaCapra’s call for a renewed Holocaust studies remains as dependent as Insdorf and Avisar upon aesthetically mediated and theologically oriented discourses and thereby serves to preempt a sustained social-institutional interrogation of Holocaust theory and culture. Instead of basing his claims simply upon either a political-economic project (Doneson) or a rationalized empiricism (Lipstadt), that is, LaCapra actually revises the very aesthetic register along which any such preemption may occur. This revision entails a relocating of the aesthetic register from the idealist and rationalist planes on which it has traditionally been situated onto a plane of quotidian experience, wherein the operative agency of its interpretability shifts from the ethereal realm of moral feeling to the tangible activity of the human body.

In order to accomplish this, LaCapra refines a concept, the *differend*, inaugurated within contemporary literary theory by postmodern philosopher Jean-François Lyotard. For Lyotard, a performative enactment of inaudibility, rather than any reasoned discursive enunciation, is seen as the last remaining mode of authentic post-Holocaust representation. In Lyotard’s view, the Adornian contention that the history and culture of the Holocaust may be ascertained and subjected to critical analysis, even judgment, through a socio-historically reflexive philosophical praxis, is no longer relevant to/in the postmodern era. He argues, instead, that the rhetorical structures necessary to

such a praxis have been detached or deflected ineluctably from any discernible, reliable conceptual axis that might otherwise authorize them and henceforth legitimize truth claims about the Holocaust.⁸⁶

For LaCapra, who likewise calls for a mode of Holocaust knowledgeability synchronous with the postmodern notion of a self-evident real, however, the liminal inaudibility signified by the performative *differend* circumnavigates an “extreme theoreticism”⁸⁷: the *differend* disallows the dialogics of witnessing and confession so central to the “Judeo-Christian” ethos he believes pervades and demarcates the Holocaust and its psychotherapeutic rehearsal as “Holocaust.” So as to retain the “extreme” core of the Lyotardian view, LaCapra supplements “*differend*” with a notion of “anthropological sacrifice” he gleans carefully and selectively from René Girard.⁸⁸ This unmistakably christological interpolation of Judaic notions of sacrifice⁸⁹ presupposes a “primitive” economics of social determination; the repeatedly violent, often murderous, frequently celebrated displacement and projection of meaning onto designated and particular (groups of) subjects is deemed by Girard the central and necessary defining praxis of cultural identity and communal survival. For LaCapra, this veritably organic-racialist theory of social foundation and regeneration, which he himself initially concedes may offer little more than a nostalgic, pseudoscientific rationale for universal social destruction, can nonetheless be culled strategically to ground and thereby ameliorate the elusiveness of the Lyotardian *differend*. The capacity to speak or to represent vis-à-vis “others” supplies the means by which to reinscribe the *differend*’s liminality into a recognizable as well as prescriptive cultural form—namely, into a myth allegorizable to the Girardian paradigm, a myth perennially familiar to Western culture, but to which LaCapra does not refer outright as the Christian mystery play.⁹⁰

On this line, what previously was considered the *differend*’s speculative significance, incapable by its presumed contingency of serious review, may now claim legitimacy and accountability as an accessible, realizable, *speaking* manifestation of an essential and eternal *human* condition.⁹¹ This claim is made, more precisely, through an allegorical rearticulation of the dominant, ever prevailing, christo-sacrificial myth. With respect to Holocaust theory, this (onto)mythological reinscription allows what Lyotard presupposes, and LaCapra does not dispute: the liminal character of holocaustal horror and violence undergoes a reenactment whose ensuing viability of expression and enunciation becomes proof both of “Holocaust”’s human pervasiveness and the persisting ontological necessity of its repetition for the survival of human community.

LaCapra underscores this remythologization by likewise granting to the human condition an epistemologically diffuse temporality, a “lived experience” of time’s passage bound immanently within an eternally recurring, intersubjective cycle. LaCapra posits an irruptive quality to this recurrent

passage, which may displace discursive and rhetorical structures of speech, and in this way compel historical transformation, from an asymptotic position inascertainable to theory but subject to normative regulation within an “ethicopolitical” space of ritual interaction.⁹² Citing both Kierkegaard and social theorist Jürgen Habermas, LaCapra clarifies that, for all its opacity, this impulse to historical transformation is not impossible but will impart primarily by virtue of a “conversionlike experiential choice” to which members of the ritually bound human community may consent vis-à-vis its presumed unintelligible because ambiguous horizon of “repetitive temporality”—in fact, its *differend*.⁹³ The existential-phenomenological sense of temporal alterity and its perceptual cognition undergirding this formulation contrasts an *historical* sense for which the experience of time is construed socially, in accordance with class, gender, and racial positioning within the material relations of production and exchange, and for which qualitatively different experiences of temporality and change, and the strategic decisions made possible in relation to them, are therefore fundamentally political, not merely existential.⁹⁴ Apparently inconsequential to LaCapra is the fact that, through this naturalizing, mythologizing conceptualization of temporal passage and social interaction and cohesion, the erroneous but persistent formulation of Jewish history as intrinsically (self-)sacrificial and beyond reasoned intelligibility remains implicitly unchallenged. In effect LaCapra precludes awareness and critique of that formulation’s material historical conditions: the christological discourse framing LaCapra’s anthropological turn ramifies on/to an otherwise post-hermeneutic, post-theological scholarly terrain. Meanwhile the familiar phenomenological notion of the Holocaust is upheld, as is, by association, the notion of the proverbial suffering Jew as ineffable—nay, obscene—and as an index of transhistorical truth.⁹⁵

LaCapra in this way implicitly disregards the Levinasian admonition against christo-anthropological modalities, and henceforth redeploys a decidedly Christian notion of “Otherness”—the universal and eternal recurrence of pathetic human suffering—as the fulcrum of Holocaust intelligibility.⁹⁶ He thus lends credibility to the holocaustal fears of Jewish particularists like Avisar and Doneson, as he belies the ameliorative function of “dialogic exchange” while mollifying its real divisiveness through patronizing gestures of communal incorporation. He in turn disallows what otherwise might have helped enable more thoroughgoing, substantive kinds of Holocaust, not to mention Judaic and Christian, knowledgeabilities. This would have had the effect of opening the question so crucial within Cinema Studies, and raised variously within certain strands of liberation theology,⁹⁷ of the relevance of “Holocaust” to contemporary global culture. As such, the broad interdisciplinary scope of LaCapra’s post-Holocaust therapeutic must finally be seen as an elite-populist,