

Rebuilding Sustainable Communities in Iraq

Rebuilding Sustainable Communities in Iraq:
Policies, Programs
and International Perspectives

Edited by

Adenrele Awotona



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by Adenrele Awotona

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PREFACE

The scene in Iraq is rife with a troubling and destabilizing vacuum; and, at the moment, Iraq is unsustainable—by reason of a host of calamities, and prodigious internal polarities. Regardless, Iraq must be rebuilt with sustainable communities; and a heavy onus falls upon the United States of America to that end. While, on the one hand, the principal U.S. government agencies currently occupying Iraq are exerting Herculean and seeming protean effort toward rebuilding Iraq; on the other hand, it is believed that such efforts will fail without proper augmentation of missing expertise (especially at the community redevelopment level); without refocus toward holism (by bringing synergy amongst top-down and bottom-up experts); and, without a better concentration toward indigenous benefit (vice concentration on the occupying power’s national agenda). Clearly, the failure of rebuilding sustainable communities in Iraq will compound all the tragedies of Iraq and affect many beyond.

According to the most recent Quarterly Report to the U.S. Congress by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), the amounts “contributed for the reconstruction program” in Iraq totaled \$112.52 billion USD between April 2003 and March 31, 2008. This included the following: \$46 billion which was appropriated by the U.S. Congress as U.S. aid for Iraq, \$50.33 billion in Iraqi funds, and \$15.89 billion in international support.¹ Approximately half of the U.S. aid was expended on “hard” infrastructure (large-scale construction) while the rest went into the development of “soft” infrastructure” (non-construction programs such as “supporting democracy and governance, operations and maintenance, training and equipment”).

However, Iraq continues to be unstable and there are escalating condemnations of Iraq reconstruction efforts from many and varied quarters (Tarnoff, 2007).²

So why have reconstruction efforts in Iraq, and billions of dollars of investment, yielded such little and problematical results? Many questions come to the fore. For example, to what degree have these reconstruction efforts taken in and focused upon the support of social, economic, and infrastructural development in a sustainable way? To what extent has institutional support been provided for community-based organizations? What are the politics of state reconstruction and conflict management?

What is the regional and global impact of rebuilding Iraq? Where are the intersections of the humanities and legal structures? To what extent have the international community and the U.S. gone beyond the upgrading and refurbishing of the infrastructure to empowering community-based grassroots organizations and capacity building for sustainable development? What is the function of the arts in rebuilding communities—art (literature, the visual arts, theater, music) as a mode of giving form to aspirations for the self, community, and nation and as a vehicle for recording the process of rebuilding? And, what approaches should be adopted in order to ensure more positive outcomes?

The aim of this book is to examine many of these issues from multidisciplinary and cross-disciplinary perspectives. Amongst the topics that the contributing authors have explored are the following: the role of organizations and institutions in defining strategies for sustainable rebuilding of community infrastructure; the theoretical issues in, and practical approaches to, the rebuilding of sustainable communities after disasters; the social, cultural and technological aspects in the reconstruction of war-torn societies; the role of women in defining the needs of families and children in a post-disaster environment; the role of higher education in rebuilding sustainable communities; institutionalization models for public planning and policy; rebuilding the Iraqi Oil Industry; successful project strategies in Iraq's Kurdistan region; reconstruction experiences from Afghanistan; and the prospects and limits of state building in the aftermath of the war.

This book is based mainly on some of the papers that were presented at the International Conference on *Rebuilding Sustainable Communities in Iraq: Policies, Programs and Projects* which was held at the University of Massachusetts Boston from July 23 to July 26, 2007. A central objective of the Conference was to provide an intellectual forum for scholars and practitioners from Iraq and everywhere else in the world, including the U.S., to explore how the reconstruction of Iraq could be carried out in a way that promoted social justice, economic and political sustainability, and the full participation of all stakeholders. Indeed, to the best of our knowledge, it was the first academic Conference where senior political, professional and academic leaders from Iraq have met with their counterparts from around the world (Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Spain, U.S., etc.) to discuss and consider the wide range of issues affecting the sustainable reconstruction of Iraqi communities within the context of a social justice agenda. Similarly, lessons from the Gulf Coast Recovery in the U.S. and disasters in other parts of the world, and how these could be applied to Iraq, were a recurring strand in the Conference agenda.

At the conclusion of the conference, special committees of conference experts drew up specific plans of action for the implementation of the visions discussed under three main themes. These were: *Action Plan for Economic Expansion and Stability*; *Action Plan for Recreating Infrastructure*; and *Action Plan for the Higher Education Sector and Education Facilities*. Summaries of their recommendations are set out below.

Action Plan for Economic Expansion and Stability

Although Iraq is potentially a rich country, it is in need of outside help in the short- and the medium-terms. The International Compact with Iraq, which was adopted recently by the international community, demonstrates the needs of Iraq for grants and soft loans, as well as in-kind technical assistance.

Economic development is much dependent on regional security. Correspondingly, in most cases, insecurity causes economic stagnation and lack of job opportunities; hence, that conundrum highlights the importance of economic expansion.

Requirements for Achieving Facilitating Conditions for Economic Development

The essential elements of sustainable economic development include the following: prepare sound strategies, policies, plans and programs; modernize the legal and regulatory systems, including taxation; adopt a market-oriented and private sector-driven economic system; ensure diversification of the economy for less dependence on the energy sector; develop banking and insurance infrastructure; revitalize and expand quality assurance institutions; expand production of electricity and fuel; and build capacity for all institutions supporting economic development.

Action Plan for Recreating Infrastructure

The purpose of this Action Plan is to develop sustainable infrastructure that meets the needs of society while respecting its cultural values. We must ensure inclusion of all stakeholders in the process and development—notably including women, and other individuals

irrespective of their economic or physical ability e.g. youth, the elderly and the disabled. Their human capital and the community are the target of this infrastructure.

We define infrastructure as pertaining to:

- 1) the built environment, including the physical aspects of the human environment including but not limited to roads, water, sewer, electricity, and data utilities, housing, buildings and facilities;
- 2) the institutional structures of society which include the management and governance aspects of the community and its settlements—e.g. mayor’s office, public works department, redevelopment agencies, governing councils and community outreach organizations;
- 3) socio-economic and human capital services such as health facilities, education facilities, banks, private businesses, and other social services.

We recommend the use of “safe” areas (free from lawlessness and terror) within the country as hubs for capacity building for Iraqis. Start the rebuilding process in the safe areas; focus more on development of rural areas to ensure equitable distribution of development and to be sensitized to overtaxing of urban areas; the process of rebuilding sustainable communities in Iraq should involve active participation of local citizens in partnership with the programmers from the building industry to accommodate the socio-cultural needs of the community. Simply stated—do all planning in concert with local Iraqis; a broad base of coordinated programs needs to bring together professionals from a cross section of the country (health care, community/development planners, architects, government); and, infrastructure reconstruction and development must be undertaken through a partnership between all stakeholders such as government, NGOs, donors, professionals, etc.—whose policies and strategies must guide the process. Actions must be based on strategy and sound policies guided by the stakeholders at different levels, including national, urban and rural. One key to success will be a focus on the requirements of the local community—as the implementation of policies and strategies must respond to local needs; and, similarly, priority must be given to empowering the local community and strengthening its economy,

by maximizing the utilization of resident human and business resources, as well as developing enhanced local capacity.

Action Plan for the Higher Education Sector and Educational Facilities

From the conference discussions and presentations, the following needs were identified for rebuilding higher education in Iraq:

- A- An assessment of the current status of Iraqi Universities by a team of U.S. and international experts in the field for the establishment of a modern system of higher education in Iraq. Essential in this is the assurance of the autonomy of the university governance so as not to impede university functions by a government bureaucracy.
- B- Establishment of a strategy and a time line for the implementation of the recommended actions defined by the Committee.
- C- Defining a plan for the training of Iraq's senior universities' management teams in the U.S. on how to build a modern university infrastructure in Iraq.
- D- Defining the needs for curriculum and faculty development in the various colleges and programs of the universities.
- E- Defining the needs for building the college infrastructure from the classroom to the laboratories and libraries necessary for first-rate teaching and research universities.
- F- Defining the needs for establishing a research and development infrastructure that can be utilized by faculty and graduate students in their research programs.
- G- The establishment of a first-rate information technology resource to be available to the students, faculty and administrators, linked to the many international libraries and the U.S. Library of Congress.
- H- Establishment of a network of collaborative agreements with International Educational Institutions around the world, particularly in the U.S. and Europe.
- I- Establishment of a network of linkages for graduate studies with U.S. institutions, as well as a network of research collaboration with U.S. faculty and students.

- J- An action plan for the recruitment of highly qualified and experienced teaching and research faculty from around the world to help jump-start teaching and research at the universities.
- K- An action plan for the establishment of an interconnected library system for the service of the faculty and students in the different Iraqi universities.

Structure of the Book

This book is aimed at scholars, public and private sector officials, non-governmental organizations, consultants and practitioners in the following areas (amongst others): international relations; Middle Eastern studies; social sciences (political science, sociology, psychology, cultural studies, anthropology, economics, etc.); multidisciplinary studies; liberal arts; sustainable community development; land economy; community studies/planning; public policy; urban studies; urban planning; urban design; architecture; dispute/conflict resolution; legal studies; women's studies; post-war reconstruction; and environmental studies.

It consists of 12 chapters, which are divided into three sections. Section 1, which has one chapter, examines some cross-cutting themes and conceptual issues. Section 2, with six chapters, reports case studies from Iraq. Section 3, with five chapters, presents a number of international perspectives and their lessons for Iraq. These studies spring from Afghanistan, the U.S. and Africa.

In chapter 1, Adenrele Awotona and Michael Donlan describe the disaster caused in Iraq by reason of the U.S. invasion and by reason, as well, of a wholly unsatisfactory and unsustainable process of top-down anecdotal rebuilding. They therefore advocate a wholly new mindset: whereby rebuilding becomes holistically, professionally planned—so as to be balanced between top-down and bottom-up with empowered indigenous institutions working at both top levels and local levels. They propose a major reorientation of the process of rebuilding so as to appreciate and embrace sustainability.

Awotona and Donlan then define sustainability. They establish a distinction between immediate and ultimate sustainability. In the case of ultimate sustainability, they marshal and summarize the many worthy studies issued out and taken in by the United Nations on sustainability over the past two decades. Simply put: sustainability must balance much, but above all it must always balance the needs of both the present and the future. Ultimately, rebuilding must not compromise the long-term

environment or self-empowerment of Iraq. Conversely, immediate sustainability should understand and be sensitive to the critical nature of transparent process and empowerment achieved by bringing in and bringing forward Iraqis (both nationally and locally). The ultimate sustainable professional planning must be shaped with major involvement of the newly empowered Iraqis.

Section 2 begins with chapter 2, in which Gerald Paulus outlines a strategy “to increase employment, revitalize the economy, reduce the insurgency, and to provide regional stability” in Iraq. The premise of this approach is that “human behavior is motivated by self-interest”; and, that the Iraqi people should be given a “cause to live for” which is far more attractive than a “cause to die for”. The “cause to live for” would be an economic plan that would create small public works projects to put “people to work rebuilding their own neighborhoods, cities and country; provide them an opportunity to support their families; (and) rally them toward a vision for a better future.” Basically, what Paulus is advocating for is a network of small work camps throughout Iraq that would empower the people economically through the provision of jobs and training. In chapter 3, Tom Syring examines two of the four interconnected “pillars” that must be addressed in order to ensure a successful and sustainable post-conflict resolution. These are *governance and (democratic) participation*; and *justice and reconciliation*. The other two pillars are security and, social and economic well-being. After a detailed analysis of the “Iraqi experience of drafting a new constitution, and establishing a higher criminal tribunal,” Syring concludes that “while establishing legal institutions is of vital importance in any attempt at state-rebuilding, their success depends on externalities that can only be outlined, not guaranteed by law *per se*, i.e., on truly independent and fair trials, a broadly accepted constitution, and a population imbued with a desire for peaceful participation—anything less is but a lure.” Chapter 4, by Douglas Green, reports the outcome of a collaborative project between a Washington D.C.-based nonprofit organization and local community activists in the Kurdistan region of northern Iraq. The organization is the Leadership Council for Human Rights, which

focuses on the unique concerns of women and ethnic minorities, understands the immense potential that these grassroots leaders hold and has formed partnerships to carry out home-grown, community-level interventions that will have a far-reaching impact (see page 75 herewith).

The project was mainly concerned with the education and empowerment of women and other marginalized Iraqis; the preservation of cultural heritage; and the intensification of cross-cultural appreciation that is imperative for the future of Iraq.

In chapter 5, Justin Dargin outlines strategies that should be implemented in Iraq in order to “create a viable petroleum sector, and to construct a constitutional and legal infrastructure as an integral part of a coherent national petroleum policy.” Dargin notes that Iraq has the world’s third largest proven oil reserves (115 billion barrels), and that

only institutional and constitutional safeguards, including financial accountability and the equitable apportioning of its oil revenues, will guarantee Iraq’s health (see page 85 herewith).

Chapter 6, by Besim Hakim, examines a number of issues that are “directly linked” to Iraqi society’s values and ethics, decision-making processes, management practices (including rules and codes for planning and construction), as well as the policies that are necessary for rebuilding Iraqi communities in a sustainable fashion. For example, he proposes that “the possibility is open during the reconstruction process to recycle the positive aspects of traditional Iraqi indigenous design and practice at the levels of neighborhoods, building design and construction practices.” In chapter 7, Mohammad Sadik analyzes the place of higher education in the development process in Iraq. He observes that “higher education is essential to exploit our tremendous abundance of petroleum wealth in ways that best serve the public interest where each and every Iraqi citizen benefits equitably.”

Section 3 begins with the chapter by Michael A. Burayidi and Craig Maher. Their central proposition is that

the U.S. has a long history of community participation in national development and some of the lessons learned from this experience could be applicable to Iraq as the country contemplates reconstruction efforts to amend a shattered nation after the war. (see page 127 herewith).

Some of the lessons which the authors explored and analyzed, based on case studies, were: the need for a national law requiring that government-assisted programs include resident participation; the need for a follow-up review of agency programs to ensure that the agencies actually followed through with their plans to involve the public in the development process; and the need for development agencies to devote considerable

time to their outreach efforts in order to ensure the effectiveness and success of community participation in nation building.

In chapter 9, Michael Donlan and Muhammad Ali-Salaam propose a distinct exemplar model for prospective usage in Iraq to accelerate institutional public planning on the local level: to that end, they offer the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) as a prime exemplar. While on the one hand there is a “mountain to climb” by way of professionalizing and systematizing institutional process for local post-disaster rebuilding in Iraq; on the other hand, there is a prime exemplar available for replication to fill much of that void. The BRA offers many features, and these features are largely unique thereto. That model is set out in full detail. Sustainability, while essential for rebuilding, is a challenge all its own, requiring holism, balance, transparency, comprehension, empowerment and professionalism, which in itself requires time-tested institutional processes and implementation of professional planning—and more. Further, according to Michael and Muhammad, true sustainability is achieved only when a genuine mix of public and *private* funding enter a post-disaster scene. The BRA model expertly applies to such a mix; and more compelling, the BRA model uniquely attracts such a funding mix. And finally, the BRA can cause sustainable rebuilding at the dénouement of the public funding sourcing—by drawing forth wholly private investment in rebuilding.

Chapter 10 is authored by Najim Azadzoi and Michael Hicks. They are both architects who have extensive experience with development projects in Afghanistan. They note that many of the challenges Iraq faces today could be found in Afghanistan when that country’s reconstruction effort began in 2002. While acknowledging that Iraq and Afghanistan are undoubtedly very different nations, they argue that many of the lessons that were learned in Afghanistan can be applied to the reconstruction of Iraq.

In chapter 11, Yomi Oruwari makes a case for the development of dynamic and efficient women’s groups that would form an important part of the means for actually assisting the households rebuild their communities and consequently their state as part of the post-war peace building and reconstruction process in Iraq. She does this by using the experiences of women’s groups in conflict resolution and peace-building in Nigeria’s Niger Delta Region (an area that is prone to violent conflict) as a starting point in exploring the changing role of Iraqi women in rebuilding their communities and the policies, programs and projects that will assist them to effectively perform this challenging role in the Iraqi context.

In the final chapter, Asgedet Stefanos explores the degree to which Eritrean women enhanced their status and rights during a successful 30-year national independence struggle against Ethiopian occupation. The period analyzed begins in 1974 as the national liberation struggle's male leadership formally embraced full female participation in the liberation organization, the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), and promulgated a commitment and program to establish gender equality. The period under study ends with Eritrea's military victory and national independence in 1993. With the view that specificity and historical context are critical for understanding women and conflict, the roles and status of Eritrean women in traditional society and under colonial occupations are summarized. The chapter examines a protracted armed conflict that not only victimized women (and their children), but also mobilized them to seize opportunities to improve their conditions within the political, economic, educational, and familial realms. It reflects the view that, as one of society's most vulnerable groups, women are disproportionately victimized by war; but at the same time they are also agents who creatively struggle to survive, and if possible, empower themselves during the enormous dislocations and hardships of armed conflict. The theories and policies of the EPLF regarding women's emancipation are delineated. The chapter is primarily focused on the bottom-up experience and perceptions of a diverse sample of Eritrean women who were extensively interviewed in field studies. In regards to gender equity, it assesses both the congruence and dissonance between the perceptions, priorities and aspirations emphasized by Eritrean women from below and those of the male leadership from above. This approach is relevant for other contexts, including efforts to shape an effective and sustained effort to enhance the status of Iraqi women.

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PART I
CROSS-CUTTING THEMES

CHAPTER 1

RECONSTRUCTING IRAQ: MASSIVE INVESTMENT, LITTLE SUSTAINABLE RESULTS

Introduction

Reconstruction in Iraq is generally acknowledged to be in a disappointing state. We believe the situation is even worse than reported; yet, any hope of a successful resolution of the problems in Iraq swings on successful achievement of sustainable rebuilding of communities. Not only is the state of reconstruction a major disappointment; its overall strategy was wrongly conceived and is being so pursued.

The overall strategy and construct of the rebuilding effort must be reoriented more toward sustainable community rebuilding. The top-down and anecdotal rebuilding process must be recognized as inadequate and, in turn, be strongly complemented by a systematized and balancing process (bottom-up as well as top-down) of sustainable community rebuilding by genuine experts. The existing efforts and the newer processes must combine together, so as to work toward a positive and integrated dynamic tension. Broad community empowerment is imperative; and that newly empowered community must become a major contributor and commentator on the course and accountability of rebuilding.

At the outset, the U.S. Department of Defense was able to convince the U.S. Administration that the military knew best—even as to the rebuilding of Iraq. That mindset never changed, despite the helpful changes just put in place in military strategy (prompted by recognition of mistakes); similar changes must be made to the rebuilding strategies and implementation, or the current disappointment will become permanent. However, a most difficult conundrum lurks: sustainable rebuilding requires security and security requires sustainable rebuilding, and the stakes are too high to let this correctable, troubled scene become another tragic failure.

It is imperative to critique the scene. It is now 2008, and massive funds have been expended with disappointing results. For example, as noted in *The Economist* in April 2006, “Iraq has already cost America more than \$250 billion” and that, according to one study, it could “cost America an eye-catching \$2.24 trillion through 2015.”¹ But still, only a

low fraction of funds available and/or promised has been expended for reconstruction, and even less funding has been expended toward sustainable rebuilding on the community level. According to a 2008 article in *The Washington Times* by Sharon Behn, “out of \$10 billion budgeted for capital projects in 2007, only 4.4 percent had been spent by August.” Behn further observed that

increased Iraqi oil revenues stemming from high prices and improved security are piling up in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York rather than being spent on needed reconstruction projects.²

This chapter plumbs and probes the nature of sustainable community rebuilding and the compelling imperative thereof.

The Context

Rebuilding of Iraq is critical. A stable and sustainable Iraq is critical to the Middle East and to the national strategic priorities of the U.S. and its allies. Yet, post-war (and pre-post-war) Iraq is unstable—and will so persist—in the absence of serious and successful sustainable rebuilding of Iraq’s many communities, as well as Iraq as a nation. New, vital ingredients must be added to this already massive, but still unimpressive, rebuilding—indeed, more massive than any estimate to date. The rebuilding effort has been over balanced on the national, top-down (and seemingly serendipitous) level in Iraq, with disappointing results. Glaringly insufficient efforts have been directed toward community-oriented, bottom-up rebuilding, and consequently the results at that level are worse than disappointing.

Simply put, rebuilding sustainable communities must be holistic, integrated and balanced, so that bottom-up rebuilding at the community level becomes as important as top-down rebuilding at the national level, and sustainable rebuilding of soft infrastructure as important as rebuilding of hard infrastructure.

Early commitment to reconstruction. In 2004, the World Bank and the UN established the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq to help “donor nations channel their resources and coordinate their support for reconstruction and development in Iraq.”³ Similarly, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has expressed its commitment to support Iraqis in rebuilding their country by carrying out

programs in education, health care, food security, infrastructure reconstruction, airport and seaport management, economic growth, community development, local governance, and transition initiatives.⁴

In fact, the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF), which is administered and funded by the U.S., had alone expended about \$11.4 billion USD between April 2003 and March 2006.

Broad disappointment. An extensive and intensive survey of numerous recent reports has revealed that the efforts of the Iraqi government, the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF), the United Nations Development Group, the World Bank, and other multilateral agencies to rebuild Iraq continue to be less than victorious. Some of these publications include the following: *Rebuilding Iraq: Reconstruction Progress Hindered by Contracting, Security, and Capacity Challenges*; *Rebuilding Iraq: Integrated Strategic Plan Needed to Help Restore Iraq's Oil and Electricity Sectors*; and *Military Operations: The Department of Defense's Use of Solatia and Condolence Payments in Iraq and Afghanistan*.⁵

Background

The Center for Rebuilding Sustainable Communities after Disasters at the University of Massachusetts Boston (the Center) has embarked upon a sustained effort to promote a series of conferences on the *Rebuilding of Sustainable Communities in Iraq*. The first such conference took place in Boston in July 2007. The purpose of these conferences is to attract experts in the realm of rebuilding sustainable communities—both academic and practitioners—from international sources, especially the Middle East.

Their proposals are to be presented, published and critiqued. By design, these experts will know and understand community rebuilding from the bottom-up (as well as top-down). Furthermore, these experts appreciate the combined contribution toward holism of a mix of both hard and soft infrastructure.

And, in contrast, it is the belief of the Center (and these experts) that non-experts have long held a “default disposition” that such rebuilding efforts can readily suffer over-balanced, serendipitous and top-down efforts (especially when there are immediate military exigencies) and can be so pursued anecdotally (especially toward hard infrastructure) by whoever is in power (regardless of lack of expertise and resultant

predisposition thereto). But, we believe, such “making do” after disasters will not do.

Disasters are prone to become compounded in the absence of expert responses. Disasters inflict trauma and heavy damage. Societies are set back and typically experience a severe vacuum of established essential modalities. Civilization has sought to evolve in salutary fashion (apart from disasters); and, as such, salutary institutions are sought out and promoted. In turn, these salutary institutions (soft infrastructure) must be made to survive disasters. Conversely, when a severe vacuum is encountered post-disaster, unsavory opportunists endemically seek to exploit the situation—starting off with looters. Public health is vulnerable; families must evacuate if their children are to avoid prolonged setbacks; the status of women becomes an early concern. Sustainability comes into question.

Lacking expert attention to the conditions of disaster, classic disasters are prone to become compounded and increasingly complex. Furthermore, when the disaster strikes in a realm such as Iraq that was already a fragile yet totalitarian state with prospective societal divisions, such risk becomes inordinately acute.

Priority of military and military resolution. The military was put in charge of both the invasion and the rebuilding of Iraq. The invasion was expected to take but a few months, to dispose of the Iraqi Army and establish a comfortable peace. Presumably, that would have happened if the U.S. used the standard size force for such an attack and occupation (300,000); but hubris took over, and only half of that force was used. Then the Iraqi Army “melted away” and was advised not to return. Finally, the Baathist political party was made *persona non grata*—such that ordinary managers and civil servants were similarly sent into (internal) exile. A traumatic vacuum arose, and that vacuum was readily filled by unsavory destabilizing insurgents. A cottage industry for civil war arose, and a comfortable peace never settled.

The military is still in control and still trying to achieve a workable settled peace. Contrary to plan (presumably a best-case plan), matters descended into a maelstrom—until an attempt was made to reach down within the military resources and infuse more forces on the ground (from 120,000 to 160,000), which was termed the Surge. This Surge has turned a tide, but the improvement is far from comfortable.

The losses in military lives are serious, and the rate of wounded is as bad as any war ever encountered; the military cannot be readily relegated